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The question of whether or not States may lawfully resort to actions in 
self-defence against non-State actors (NSA) is prompted by two elements: i) 
the emerging practice of States1 resorting to force in self-defence against ter-
rorist groups including the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL); and 
ii) United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions seemingly legiti-
mising self-defence against NSA (i.e. UNSC Res. 1368 [2001]; UNSC Res. 
2249 [2015]). From a scholarly viewpoint, such developments would entail 
interpreting Art. 51 of the Charter of the United Nations (UN Charter) in a 
manner such as to encompass armed attacks carried out by states and NSA 
alike.2 
The UN Charter envisages two exceptions to the prohibition on the use 
of force codified in Art. 2 (4) UN Charter: self-defence against an armed 
attack; and enforcement measures implying the use of force decided by the 
UNSC pursuant to Art. 42. In considering the adoption of military 
measures in response to threats and breaches of international peace and se-
curity, one may observe that Art. 42 UN Charter may actually serve as an 
appropriate legal basis for the adoption of military measures against ISIL, 
and has in fact the merit of preserving the system of collective security as it 
has been envisaged by the drafters of the UN Charter. In contrast, broaden-
ing the scope of Art. 51 UN Charter to grant states the right to self-defence 
against NSA is premised upon somewhat slippery bases. 
This contribution intends to shed light on the shortcomings of invoking 
Art. 51 as a legal basis for military measures against ISIL, and presents the 
advantages of invoking Art. 42 instead. This would lead to: 
 
1. no Pindaric interpretation of Art. 51 (stretched to the point of applying 
the “unwilling or unable state” doctrine);  
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1  E.g. the US claimed that the Operation Enduring Freedom against Afghanistan was 
grounded on Art. 51 UN Charter. 
2  The present contribution focusses on Art. 51 UN Charter. The author is aware that self-
defence under customary international law may not fully coincide in scope with Art. 51 UN 
Charter. 
 
 
© 2017, Max-Planck-Institut für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht
http://www.zaoerv.de
36 Lo Giacco 
ZaöRV 77 (2017) 
2. compliance of Art. 51 interpretation with Art. 2 (4), which speaks about 
inter-state relations (Art. 51 would as a consequence be understood as an 
exception to use of force in inter-state relations, hence against an armed at-
tack of another state); and 
3. safeguards against abusive powers of states in determining actions in self-
defence when an armed attack occurs. 
 
The discourse surrounding Art. 51 triggers questions of a revisionary na-
ture. Self-defence, qua a circumstance precluding wrongfulness, entails the 
existence of a wrongful act in the first place. Hence, it would in principle 
compel construing NSA as subjects of international law and, as such, bear-
ers of the obligation to refrain from using armed force under public interna-
tional law.3 This conceptual hurdle has been questionably overcome by re-
sorting to the “unwilling or unable state” doctrine, in order to satisfy the 
attributability-test of the NSA armed attack to the state where the NSA op-
erates. Alternatively, the consent of the State hit by measures in self-defence 
has been considered determinant to exclude wrongfulness of such measures. 
Although the term “armed attack” in Art. 51 does not specifically refer to 
a state armed attack, the joint reading of Arts. 51 and 2 (4) UN Charter is 
conducive to interpret self-defence within an inter-state dimension.4 
Similarly, the temporal scope of self-defence, in particular in its anticipa-
tory variant against ISIL’s threats to commit new attacks, poses questions of 
conformity with Art. 51 UN Charter insofar as it only concerns cases in 
which “an armed attack occurs”. 
Remarkably, the UN collective security system is centred around the role 
of the UNSC in countering armed attacks. This is supported by the word-
ing of Art. 51 which, while recognising the inherent right of states to self-
defence, reaffirms the pivotal role of the UNSC in the resort to military 
force in the expression “until the Security Council has taken the measures 
necessary to maintain international peace and security”. 
In the framework of Chapter VII, Art. 42 has been designed as a provi-
sion of last resort, in case of a failure of measures not implying the use of 
force pursuant to Arts. 40 and 41 UN Charter. This is consistent with the 
                                                        
3  In this respect, questions as to the capability of NSA (arguably, this umbrella-term en-
compasses a spectrum of actors with diverse capabilities) to actually launch an armed attack 
against a State for it to resort to self-defence incidentally arise. 
4  Art. 2 (4) reads: “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the 
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state 
(…).” (emphasis added) 
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purposes of the UN enumerated in Art. 1 UN Charter, in particular with 
maintaining international peace and security (Art. 1 (1) UN Charter). 
Notoriously, the practice of the UNSC has already developed towards 
imposing Chapter VII-measures against NSA (including individuals, groups 
of individuals, and legal entities)5 and it would be no surprise if those actors 
were made the target of military actions agreed upon by the UNSC. Hence, 
the application ratione personae of Art. 42 would not raise the same contro-
versies of Art. 51. Having an enforcement character, Art. 42-measures do 
not require the consent of the targeted state,6 unlike – as mentioned earlier – 
cases of self-defence against NSA would require. Most importantly, Art. 42-
measures may be resorted to in case of breaches of the peace (armed attack 
or lower threshold violations of the non-use of force) and threats to the 
peace alike, thus encompassing a broader spectrum of situations than Art. 
51. This is noteworthy as state military actions against ISIL are arguably 
resorted to against threats of future attacks. Further, if the use of force is 
authorised pursuant to Art. 42 UN Charter, the UNSC is to determine the 
scope of the mandate, including a temporal delimitation for the resort to 
such measures. 
The claim of an emerging practice corroborating the existence of a right 
to self-defence against NSA may prove appealing and perilous insofar as it 
would allow defensive actions against ISIL’s “attacks” but would decentral-
ise the use of force to the extent that States qualifying themselves as victims 
of an NSA’s armed attack may resort to military force.7 
                                                        
5  E.g. UNSC Res. 1267 (1999); 1373 (2001); 1618 (2005); 2083 (2012); 2170 (2014). 
6  See B. Simma/H. Mosler/A. Randelzhofer/C. Tomuschat/R. Wolfrum/A. Paulus/E. 
Chaitobu (eds.), The Charter of the United Nations – A Commentary, Vol. 1, 2002, 754 et 
seq. 
7  Israel sustained this position against NSA in the occupied Palestinian territories. UNSC 
Res. 2249 (2015) questionably expands States’ powers to resort to military measures at discre-
tion. 
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